The Clickjacking Attack

The Clickjacking Attack

Clickjacking tricks users into clicking something they didn’t intend to. An attacker overlays an invisible iframe on top of a decoy page - the user thinks they’re clicking a button, but actually clicks something on the hidden page.

How It Works

Visible page:
┌─────────────────────────┐
│  Click here to win!     │
│  ┌───────────────────┐  │
│  │ [CLAIM PRIZE]     │  │  ← User thinks they click this
│  └───────────────────┘  │
└─────────────────────────┘

Invisible iframe (opacity:0):
┌─────────────────────────┐
│                         │
│  Twitter.com (hidden)   │
│  ┌───────────────────┐  │
│  │ [TWEET]           │  │  ← Actually clicks this
│  └───────────────────┘  │
└─────────────────────────┘

The Attack HTML

<style>
  iframe {
    width: 500px;
    height: 500px;
    position: absolute;
    top: 0;
    left: 0;
    opacity: 0;
    z-index: 100;
  }
  .decoy-button {
    position: absolute;
    top: 200px;
    left: 100px;
    z-index: 10;
  }
</style>

<div class="decoy-button">Click me for a prize!</div>
<iframe src="https://victim-site.com/tweet"></iframe>

The user clicks the visible button, but actually clicks the invisible iframe’s “Tweet” button.

Defending Against Clickjacking

1. X-Frame-Options Header

The simplest defense. Send this HTTP header:

X-Frame-Options: DENY           // never allow in iframe
X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN     // allow if same origin

Set it on the server:

// Express.js
res.setHeader('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY');

// Nginx
add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always;

// Apache
Header always set X-Frame-Options "DENY"

2. Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors

The modern approach - more flexible:

Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none';
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self';
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors https://trusted-site.com;

3. Frame Busting with JavaScript

A client-side defense (works if JS is enabled):

if (window.top !== window.self) {
  window.top.location = window.self.location;
}

But this can be bypassed. The sandbox attribute on the attacker’s iframe can prevent it:

<iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" src="..."></iframe>

Without allow-top-navigation, the frame-busting JS can’t redirect the top window.

4. The Cookie-Based Double Submit Pattern

Generate a random token, store it in a cookie and session, and verify on sensitive actions:

// On sensitive form submission
if (req.cookies.csrf_token !== req.session.csrf_token) {
  // reject - likely clickjacking or CSRF
}

Detecting Iframe Embedding

<div id='frame-detect' style='padding:16px;background:#f1f5f9;border-radius:8px;'>
<p id='detect-status'>Checking if we're in an iframe...</p>
<pre id='detect-log' style='background:white;padding:8px;border-radius:4px;'></pre>
</div>

const log = document.getElementById('detect-log');
const status = document.getElementById('detect-status');

try {
if (window.top !== window.self) {
status.textContent = '⚠️ I am embedded in an iframe!';
status.style.color = '#ef4444';
log.textContent =
'window.self: ' + window.self.location.href + '\\n' +
'window.top: ' + window.top.location.href + '\\n' +
'These are DIFFERENT - we are framed!';
} else {
status.textContent = '✅ I am the top-level window. Not framed.';
status.style.color = '#22c55e';
log.textContent =
'window.self === window.top: true' + '\\n' +
'This page is not embedded in any iframe.';
}
} catch (e) {
// Cross-origin access to top.location throws
status.textContent = '⚠️ Cannot access top - likely cross-origin iframe';
status.style.color = '#eab308';
log.textContent = 'SecurityError: ' + e.message + '\\n' + 'This means we\\'re likely in a cross-origin iframe.';
}

window.self vs window.top

When window.self !== window.top, you’re inside an iframe.

Best Practices

1. Always set X-Frame-Options: DENY on auth pages (login, payment)
2. Use Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors for fine-grained control
3. Don’t rely solely on JavaScript frame busting - headers are the primary defense
4. For pages that legitimately need framing (widgets, embeds), restrict to specific origins:

   Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors https://partner.com;

5. Consider adding SameSite=Strict cookies for sensitive operations

Key Takeaways

• Clickjacking hides a victim site in an invisible iframe over a decoy page
• X-Frame-Options: DENY is the simplest server-side defense
• CSP frame-ancestors is the modern, more flexible approach
• Frame-busting JS (if (top !== self)) is a secondary defense
• Always protect login, payment, and social-action pages from framing
• The sandbox attribute can be used to restrict what framed content can do